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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The revelations from the Panama Papers 1  have highlighted the 
potential use of off-shore shell and shelf companies based in the British 
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies to facilitate money 
laundering, tax evasion, the financing of terrorism and other serious and 
organised crime. The use of such companies has enabled the natural 
person(s) who ultimately owned or controlled the company to remain 
concealed behind a nominee director(s) and nominee shareholder(s).2 This 
has led to international interest and pressure to increase the transparency 
in the beneficial ownership of such companies.  
This note explores the important recent developments towards 
enhancing beneficial ownership transparency, especially as regards the 
United Kingdom (UK) and its Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown 
Dependencies (CDs). It is divided into five sections. This section provides 
an introduction and background to the issue. Section 2 reviews some of 
the ongoing international efforts aimed at improving transparency in 
beneficial ownership and that is spearheaded by the Financial Action Task 
Force and the G20. Section 3 considers beneficial ownership transparency 
and law enforcement cooperation with reference to the UK, OTs and CDs. 
Section 4 then focuses on the development of public registers of the 
                                                     
* Professor, School of Law, University of Buckingham. Email: 
john.hatchard@buckingham.ac.uk 
1 For details, see the website of the Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
<https://www.icij.org/> accessed 20 July 2018. 
2  The Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, Report of the International Group Meeting on Beneficial Ownership 
(CAC/COSP/2017/CRP.5) para 32, also notes that corruption schemes 
increasingly use new sophisticated types of corporate vehicles with so-called “tax 
havens or secrecy jurisdictions” being used to facilitate the criminality. 
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beneficial ownership of companies in the OTs following the passing of 
the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018. The final section contains 
a short conclusion. 
There are 14 Overseas Territories including Anguilla, Bermuda, the 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and the Turks & Caicos 
Islands 3  whilst the Crown Dependencies comprises the Bailiwick of 
Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man. 4  All are of 
international significance as offshore financial centres. Yet, as Nicholls et 
al have pointed out, there has been “persistent criticism of the offshore 
financial sector … since there exist jurisdictions in which legal 
frameworks and practices obscure the identity of beneficial owners by, for 
example, placing ownership in the hands of nominee directors and 
shareholders”.5  Indeed the UK National Crime Agency has reportedly 
calculated that £90 billion is laundered through the UK each year and that 
“this laundering can only be done, by and large, through British overseas 
territories, which are central to this nefarious activity”.6  
The use of off-shore shell and shelf companies to purchase expensive 
real estate was highlighted in a 2014 study by Transparency International 
which found that 9.3 per cent of properties in the City of Westminster, 7.3 
per cent in Kensington & Chelsea, and 4.5 per cent in the City of London 
were owned by shell companies registered in an offshore “secrecy” 
jurisdiction.7 The study further revealed that 36,342 London properties 
                                                     
3 The full list is set out in the British Nationality Act 1981, sch 6. For a useful 
historical survey of the Caribbean OTs see Peter Clegg, ‘Non-self-governing 
Territories of the Caribbean and Debates over Autonomy’ in J West (ed), South 
America, Central America and the Caribbean 2016 (24th edn, Routledge 2016) 
33-39: available at <http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/27446/3/sac.essay.21.2.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2018. For a useful history of the OTs see Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, Overseas Territories: Security, Success and 
Sustainability (White Paper, Cm 8374, 2012). 
4  Within the Bailiwick of Guernsey there are three separate jurisdictions: 
Guernsey (which includes the islands of Herm and Jethou); Alderney; and Sark 
(which includes the island of Brecqhou). 
5 Colin Nicholls and others, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office (3rd edn, 
OUP 2017) para 23.04. 
6 Andrew Mitchell MP in the House of Commons debate of the Report Stage of 
the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill Deb 1 May 2018, 42. 
7 Transparency International, Corruption on your doorstep: How corrupt capital 
is used to buy property in the UK (Transparency International, 2014) 16. 
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were held by offshore companies with the vast majority being registered 
in the OTs and CDs.8 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has defined shell companies as: “… entities established not to 
pursue legitimate business activity but solely to obscure the identity of 
their beneficial owners and controllers”9 and noted further that a shell 
company functions as a corporate veil, providing an effective screen 
separating criminals from illicit financial activities. Findlay has also 
commented that “Shell companies that cannot be linked back to the real 
individuals in control create near-insuperable obstacles for regulators and 
law enforcement officials”.10 “Shelf companies” have also been identified 
as posing a particular problem as they “provide individuals with a 
company history and a set of company officials unrelated to the corrupt 
individual”.11 
In this context, a beneficial owner is defined in the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) Recommendations as follows: 
 
“Beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately 
owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose 
behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also includes those 
persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person 
or arrangement”.12  
 
Reflecting the often complex ownership and control structures of 
companies, the FATF Recommendations add: 
 
“Reference to “ultimately owns or controls” and “ultimate 
effective control” refer to situations in which ownership/control is 
                                                     
8 Ibid 5. More than one third of all foreign companies holding London property 
were incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (13,831 properties), Jersey 14% 
(5,960 properties), the Isle of Man 8.5% (3,472 properties) and Guernsey 8% 
(3,280 properties). 
9 OECD Steering Committee on Corporate Governance, Behind the Corporate 
Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes (Paris, 2001) 17.  
10 Michael Findlay, Daniel Neilson and Jason Sharman, ‘Global Shell Games: 
Testing Money Launderers’ and Terrorist Financiers’ Access to Shell 
Companies’ (Centre for Governance and Public Policy, 2012) 5 < 
http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Global-Shell-Games-
2012.pdf> accessed 20 July 2018.  
11 CoSP (n 2) para 50.  
12 Glossary to the FATF Recommendations. 
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exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control 
other than direct control”.13 
 
Thus the need to identify the beneficial ownership of companies, (and 
not just shell and shelf companies), has become of international and 
national significance in the fight against serious crime.  
 
2 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE 
TRANSPARENCY  
 
International efforts to improve the transparency and availability of 
beneficial ownership information are of relatively recent origin and have 
particularly focused on the work of the Financial Action Task Force and 
the G20.14  
 
2.1 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
 
The FATF is an inter-governmental body comprising 37 members. 
However, through its system of FATF-style regional bodies, some 190 
countries are now members of the FATF “family”. Its role is to set 
internationally recognised standards to combat money laundering and this 
is done through the FATF Recommendations.15 In 2003 the FATF for the 
first time addressed the issue of beneficial ownership and in particular the 
need for “competent authorities”16 to have access to beneficial ownership 
information for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. The most 
recent set of FATF Recommendations are the International Standards on 
                                                     
13 Ibid. 
14 Another key player is the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes. The Global Forum is “an international body for 
ensuring the implementation of the internationally agreed standards on tax 
transparency and exchange of information in the tax area”: see 
<https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/> accessed 15 
July 2018.  
15 See further <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/> accessed 25 July 2018. The UK is a 
member of FATF. The OTs and CDs are not members but are subject to 
assessment as to their compliance with the FATF Recommendations.  
16  “Competent authorities” refers to “all public authorities with designated 
responsibilities for combating money laundering and/or terrorist financing”. This 
includes law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, supervisory authorities, 
tax authorities and financial intelligence units: see the Glossary to the FATF 
Recommendations.  
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Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation (the FATF Recommendations). Published in 2012 they 
contain (amongst many other things) “essential measures” that all 
members of the FATF “family” are required to have in place “to enhance 
the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership information of 
legal persons and arrangements”. In particular, Recommendation 24 states 
that:  
 
“Countries should [must]17 ensure that there is adequate, accurate 
and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of 
legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion 
by competent authorities…”.18  
 
Further, an Interpretive Note to Recommendation 24 states that:  
 
“Competent authorities should [must] be able to obtain, or have 
access in a timely fashion to, adequate, accurate and current 
information on the beneficial ownership and control of companies 
and other legal persons (beneficial ownership information) that are 
created in the country”. 
 
As regards trusts, Recommendation 25 states that countries “should 
[must] ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on 
express trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee and 
beneficiaries that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by 
competent authorities”.19 
Improving the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership 
information remains a high priority, especially as few countries, including 
                                                     
17 The Glossary to the FATF Recommendations states that “For the purposes of 
assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations, the word “should” has 
the same meaning as “must”‘. 
18 The Fourth European Union (EU) Money Laundering Directive was published 
in 2015 and reflects the additional AML obligations contained in the FATF 
Recommendations. EU Member States were required to implement the Directive 
by June 2017.  
19 In 2014 the FATF published its Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial 
Ownership. This requires States to ensure that measures are in place to: prevent 
legal persons or arrangements from being used for criminal purposes; make legal 
persons/arrangements sufficiently transparent; and ensure that accurate and up-to-
date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis. 
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G20 countries, have effective cooperation mechanisms in place.20 Clearly, 
this remains work in progress. It might also be noted that the focus of the 
FATF is on law enforcement cooperation and there is no mention in the 
FATF Recommendations of the need for member countries to establish a 
public register of beneficial ownership of companies or trusts. 
 
2.2 G20 
 
The G20 is an informal group of 19 countries and the European Union 
that addresses issues relating to international economic cooperation. 
Reducing corruption remains a high priority and at its 2014 meeting in 
Australia the G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Transparency 
Ownership (the Principles) were agreed. These are a set of “core 
principles on the transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons 
and arrangements and are built on existing international instruments and 
standards”.21 The Principles include the following: 
 
1. Countries should have a definition of “beneficial ownership” that 
captures the natural person(s) who ultimately own or control the legal 
person or legal arrangement;… 
3. Countries should ensure that legal persons maintain beneficial 
ownership information onshore and that information is adequate, accurate 
and current; 
4. Countries should ensure that competent authorities (including law 
enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, supervisory authorities, tax 
authorities and financial intelligence units) have timely access to 
adequate, accurate and current information regarding the beneficial 
ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements. 
 
Again, there is no reference to a requirement for states to introduce a 
public register of beneficial ownership. 
                                                     
20  The FATF has reported that to date (July 2018) “… few countries have 
demonstrated that information is available to competent authorities on the 
beneficial owner of legal persons and arrangements, or that these persons and 
arrangements are prevented from being misused.” FATF Report to the G20 
Finance Minister and Central Bank Governors (Paris, 2018) para 23 
<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-Report-G20-FM-
CBG-July-2018.pdf> accessed 27 July 2018. 
21<www.g20.org/sites/default/files/media/g20_high-
level_principles_on_beneficial_ownership_transparency.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2018. 
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3 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION: THE UK, OTS 
AND CDS  
 
3.1 The constitutional relationship between the UK, OTs and CDs 
 
Examining the constitutional relationship between the UK and the 
OTs and the UK and the CDs respectively is fundamental to an 
understanding of recent developments concerning beneficial ownership 
transparency.  
The relationship between the UK and the OTs is set out in a 2012 UK 
Government White Paper entitled Overseas Territories: Security, Success 
and Sustainability (the OT White Paper): 
 
“The UK, the Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies 
form one undivided Realm…. Each Territory has its own 
Constitution and its own Government and has its own local laws. 
As a matter of constitutional law the UK Parliament has unlimited 
power to legislate for the Territories. Territory Constitutions set 
out the powers and responsibilities of the institutions of 
government, which for most Territories include a Governor or 
Commissioner, an elected legislature and Ministers. Governors or 
Commissioners are appointed by Her Majesty The Queen on the 
advice of Her Ministers in the UK, and in general have 
responsibility for external affairs, defence, internal security 
(including the police) and the appointment, discipline and removal 
of public officers. Elected governments have a wide range of 
responsibilities” (my emphasis). 
 
The italicised words are crucial as they emphasise that the Crown 
retains a residual power to legislate for the OTs. Indeed this is specifically 
provided for in some constitutions of the OTs. For example, section 125 
of the Cayman Islands Constitutional Order 2009 states: “There is 
reserved to Her Majesty full power to make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of the Cayman Islands”.22 The exercise of this power is 
normally undertaken by means of an Order in Council. Responsibility for 
the OTs falls on the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office.  
                                                     
22 SI No 1379. See also the Turks & Caicos Constitutional Order 2011 that is 
noted below. Such Orders may be subject to judicial review: R (Bancoult) v 
SoSFCA (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] AC 453.  
MONEY LAUNDERING, PUBLIC BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 
REGISTERS AND THE BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES 
 
10 
The CDs have a very different constitutional history. The Channel 
Islands (and probably the Isle of Man) have never been a colony or 
conquered or ceded territory and they are not part of the United Kingdom 
administratively or legally. 23  Further, they have never had any 
parliamentary representation in the House of Commons.24 They are self-
governing dependencies of the Crown with their own directly elected 
legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal and legal systems and law 
courts.25 The UK Ministry of Justice, Crown Dependencies Branch, is 
responsible for managing the constitutional relationship with the CDs.26  
As regards UK legislation, the position is as follows:  
 
                                                     
23 Guernsey and Jersey were originally part of the Duchy of Normandy when 
Duke William, following his conquest of England in 1066, became King William 
I of England. In 1204 when King John lost Normandy to the French, the islands 
elected to remain loyal to the English Crown. The Isle of Man first came under 
the English Crown in 1399, in circumstances which arguably suggest that it is a 
conquered territory. The point is of no significance today. See generally Ministry 
of Justice, Background briefing on the Crown Dependencies: Jersey, Guernsey 
and the Isle of Man (no date) <www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/moj/our-
responsibilities/Background_Briefing_on_the_Crown_Dependencies2.pdf> 
accessed 20 July 2018.  
24 This provides the basis for an argument that the principle that there should be 
no legislation without representation undermines the power of the UK parliament 
to legislate for the CDs: see Protocol to the European Convention of Human 
Rights, art 3; Mathews v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 361. A similar 
argument might be made in respect in the OTs. 
25 See R (Barclay) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 54, [2015] AC 
276. As Lady Hale, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court noted: “Not being 
part of the United Kingdom, unlike Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the 
Bailiwicks are not represented in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. They are 
economically self-sufficient. They pay no taxes to the United Kingdom and they 
receive no contribution from the revenues of the United Kingdom. They were not 
settled by, or conquered by or ceded to, the United Kingdom as colonies. Their 
link with the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth is through the 
Crown, not in the sense of the ultimate executive authority in the United 
Kingdom, but in the sense of the person of the Sovereign. The Sovereign’s 
personal representative in each Bailiwick is the Lieutenant Governor” [8]. 
26 This involves a variety of different responsibilities including involvement in 
key Crown Appointments, processing legislation for Royal Assent and issuing 
Letters of Entrustment authorising Crown Dependency Governments to negotiate 
and conclude international agreements. 
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“UK legislation rarely extends to the Crown Dependencies and 
should not be extended without first consulting the Islands” 
Authorities and obtaining their consent. In instances where it does 
extend, it may do so either by virtue of the Act itself or by Order 
in Council made with their agreement under an enabling provision 
contained in the Act which provides for it to be extended to the 
Crown Dependencies” (my emphasis).27 
 
The highlighted words emphasise that UK legislation does not 
normally extend to the CDs and in any event requires prior consultation 
with, and consent from, each of them.28 It seems doubtful that an Order in 
Council made under the prerogative could be effective in respect of 
domestic matters in the CDs without the consent of the local 
legislatures.29  
 
3.2 Law enforcement cooperation between the UK, OTs and CDs 
 
A recent United Nations report has noted that “from a law 
enforcement perspective, the abuse of “foreign” corporate vehicles that 
are incorporated outside the main jurisdiction where the … offence was 
committed constitutes the greatest problem, as it requires international 
cooperation”.30 This is particularly significant in that for the purposes of 
mutual legal assistance requests, each of the OTs and CDs is a separate 
jurisdiction.  
                                                     
27 UK Ministry of Justice ‘Factsheet on the UK’s relationship with the Crown 
Dependencies’ (2014) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/696152/crown-dependencies-factsheet.pdf> accessed 17 July 
2018. This reflects the position set out, for example in the States of Jersey Law 
2005, art 31. 
28 For a helpful discussion on the constitutional relationship see Michael Birt, 
‘The power of the UK to legislate for the Crown Dependencies without consent: 
Fact or fiction?’ (2017) 21(2) Jersey and Guernsey Law Review 152.  
29 This point is beyond the scope of this note. The issue is explored by Birt who 
argues that the only circumstances where the prerogative power could be 
exercised contrary to the wishes of the legislature in a CD would be where there 
has been a grave breakdown in law and order. In any other circumstance, it would 
be unreasonable and subject to judicial review, applying Bancoult (n 23); ibid 
161-162. 
30 CoSP report (n 2) para 33. 
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At the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit, the then British Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, proposed greater compliance by the OTs and 
CDs to provide UK tax and law enforcement authorities with access to 
company ownership records. In April 2016 this resulted in an Exchange of 
Notes between the UK Government and each of the key OTs and the 
CDs.31 In each Note, the UK and respective government (referred to as the 
“Participants”) recognised:  
 
“the importance of the provision of beneficial ownership 
information for the prevention and detection of corruption, money 
laundering, terrorism financing, financing of the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and other serious and organised 
crime”.32 
 
Each individual Note focuses on three key commitments by each of 
the Participants: 
 
i) To provide the law enforcement authorities of the other Participant with 
beneficial ownership information for corporate and legal entities 
incorporated in their respective jurisdiction; 
ii) To hold adequate, accurate and current beneficial ownership 
information for corporate and legal entities incorporated in their own 
jurisdictions; and 
iii) To give law enforcement authorities of the Participants the 
“automatic” right to the provision of unrestricted and timely (within 
twenty-four hours or, where urgently required, within an hour) beneficial 
ownership information held in the other jurisdiction.33  
 
This is a startling development, especially given the fact that 
previously, such information could only be requested by the UK via the 
mutual legal assistance process.  
                                                     
31  Beneficial Ownership: Exchange of Notes between the UK Government, 
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. 
32 See Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and 
the Government of the Cayman Islands in respect of the sharing of beneficial 
ownership information, para 2. 
33 A Technical Protocol is attached to each Exchange of Notes setting out the 
practicalities of the arrangements (the Technical Protocol).  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
13 
These commitments were made having regard to the FATF and G20 
initiatives and the UK Government’s decision to introduce a public central 
register of beneficial ownership.34 
The Exchange of Notes therefore provides for the “timely, safe and 
secure access for law enforcement [and tax] authorities to beneficial 
ownership information”, with the security of the request and information 
being provided specifically provided for in each Note.35 It remains to be 
seen whether any legal challenges arise from the exchange of beneficial 
ownership information in this manner, especially given the time-frame in 
which the information can be demanded.36  
Since then, the OTs and CDs have reportedly made “significant 
progress in implementing the commitments by introducing legislation and 
establishing, where they did not already exist, central registers or similar 
effective systems”.37 This represents a major step forward in assisting law 
enforcement agencies and tax authorities identify the ultimate beneficial 
ownership of companies registered in the OTs and CDs. Indeed the 
commitments place the OTs and CDs ahead of most other jurisdictions 
and also exceed the current FATF requirements. In May 2018, the 
Minister for Europe and the Americas, Sir Alan Duncan, informed the 
House of Commons that the arrangements had been used over seventy 
times and that this beneficial ownership data had “enhanced intelligence 
leads and investigations on illicit finance”.38  
 
                                                     
34 See Technical Protocol, para 3. 
35 See Technical Protocol, para 7(vi).  
36 For example, whether the demand meets the criteria for the provision of such 
information, especially if it is demanded within an hour. For a critical comment 
see Fillipo Noseda, ‘Too much information: When the UK gets it wrong’ (2017) 
21(2) Jersey and Guernsey Law Review 182 especially at 193-194. The author 
also asserts that “the UK government managed to strong-arm the Crown 
Dependencies and a number of Overseas Territories into signing [the Exchange 
of Notes]” at 189-190.  
37 See statement to the House of Commons by Sir Alan Duncan, Minister for 
Europe and the Americas, HC Deb 1 May 2018, vol 640 
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-05-
01/debates/18050126000009/BeneficialOwnershipInOverseasTerritoriesAndCro
wnDependencies> accessed 10 July 2018. 
38 Ibid. 
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4 THE SANCTIONS AND ANTI-MONEY ACT 2018: 
TOWARDS THE INTRODUCTION OF PUBLIC 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REGISTERS 
 
Whilst making beneficial ownership information available to law 
enforcement authorities is a major step forward, the Panama Papers 
disclosures increased the pressure from civil society organisations, in 
particular, for states to introduce a public registry of beneficial ownership. 
The UK is the first G20 country to introduce such a register. Section 
81 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 amended 
the Companies Act 2006 and requires companies to keep a “register of 
people who have significant control over the company”. A “person with 
significant control” (PSC) is an individual who meets one or more of the 
following conditions: 
 
Directly or indirectly holds more than 25% of shares in the company; 
Directly or indirectly holds more than 25% of voting rights in the 
company; 
Directly or indirectly holds the right to appoint or remove a majority 
of the directors of the company; 
Has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, significant influence or 
control over the company; 
Where a trust or firm would satisfy one of the first four conditions if it 
were an individual, any individual holding the right to exercise, or 
actually exercising, significant influence or control over the activities 
of that trust or firm. This is not limited to the trustee of the trust. 
 
The annual returns by companies (known as “confirmation 
statements”) must contain beneficial ownership details. The register is 
accessible to the public free of charge.39  
At that point, the UK Government resisted the idea of imposing 
similar provisions on the OTs or CDs. In fact some significant progress 
was later reported by the Overseas Territories Directorate in that several 
of the OTs and CDs had already established central registers of beneficial 
                                                     
39 For a review of the operation of the register see Global Witness ‘In Pursuit of 
Hidden Owners Behind Companies’ (2018) 
<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/pursuit-hidden-owners-behind-uk-
companies/> accessed 19 July 2018. 
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ownership or a similar arrangement, although only Montserrat had 
committed to establish a publicly accessible register.40  
In 2017 the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill was 
introduced in the House of Lords. This major piece of legislation was 
designed, amongst other things, to prevent money laundering through the 
use of Scottish Limited Partnerships and to provide power to impose 
sanctions on individuals for the purpose of preventing, or in response to, a 
gross human rights abuse or violation.41  
Originally it contained no provision relating to the establishment of 
public beneficial ownership registers in the OTs and CDs and an 
amendment to do so was rejected by the Government. Lord Ahmad of 
Wimbledon stated that it was only in exceptional circumstances that the 
UK would legislate for the OTs without their consent and that the 
Government wished “to take action within the existing framework of 
friendly cooperation, building on progress already made”. 42  He also 
pointed out that the FATF Recommendations did not require such 
registers but that the OTs would comply if these became an 
internationally required standard. In the House of Commons, this point 
was reiterated by Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister for Europe and the 
Americas, who made it clear that the UK Government “would have 
preferred to work consensually with the overseas territories to make those 
registers publicly available, as we have done in agreeing the Exchange of 
Notes process”.43  
However in the House of Commons at the Report Stage, a group of 
MPs from all three main political parties tabled amendments to the Bill 
requiring the UK Government to enforce public registers on the OTs and 
the CDs by the end of 2020. Without an absolute majority in the House of 
Commons, the Government decided to concede the point as regards the 
OTs (but not the CDs) to enable the enactment of the Bill on schedule.44 
                                                     
40 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Overseas Territories Directorate Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 Request Ref: 0896-17: ‘Overseas Territories and Crown 
Dependencies 2017’ 8 February 2018 
ttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/679038/FOI_0896-17_response.pdf> accessed 20 July 2018. In 
fact Jersey established a central register of current beneficial ownership in 1989 
as did Bermuda in 1981. 
41 Popularly known as the Magnitsky amendment. 
42 HL Deb 6 December 2017, c1117. 
43 HC Deb (n 37) 21. 
44 As Andrew Mitchell MP noted in the House of Commons debate on the Bill, 
the acceptance by the Government of the new provision “is evidence that, in a 
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Sir Alan Duncan informed the House of Commons that the UK 
Government recognised the majority view and would not oppose the 
amendment, this despite his view that legislating directly would damage 
the autonomy of the OTs.45 
The Act came into force on May 23 2018. Section 51 is headed 
“Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in 
British Overseas Territories” and provides as follows: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of the detection, investigation or prevention 
of money laundering, the Secretary of State must provide all 
reasonable assistance to the governments of the British Overseas 
Territories to enable each of those governments to establish a 
publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of 
companies registered in each government’s jurisdiction”.46 
 
Such register is to be broadly in line with the UK provisions, noted 
earlier.47 
Mindful of the reluctance that some OTs might display in establishing 
such a register, section 51(2) carries a threat in that: 
 
“The Secretary of State must, no later than 31 December 2020, 
prepare a draft Order in Council requiring the government of any 
British Overseas Territory that has not introduced a publicly 
accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies 
within its jurisdiction to do so”. 
 
Not surprisingly, the reaction from some OTs was very critical of 
these provisions with two main concerns being raised.  
Firstly, the fact that a public register would put the OTs at an 
economic disadvantage in relation to other off-shore jurisdictions, such as 
Delaware and Panama, which do not have such a register. It was argued 
that inevitably this would lead to individuals moving their companies 
                                                                                                                        
hung parliament, power passes from the Cabinet room to the Floor of the House 
of Commons”: HC Deb (n 37) 41. 
45 HC Deb (n 43). 
46  s49(3) provides that “Money laundering” has the meaning given by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 340(11). 
47 s22(7) provides that “a “publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership 
of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, 
provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the 
provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006”. 
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elsewhere and thus have a negative impact on the financial and corporate 
services provided by the OTs. This is an understandable concern although 
it is perhaps unlikely that this will significantly affect those who are using 
these services for legitimate purposes. Of course the only way to resolve 
this concern conclusively is to establish a level playing field with the 
global introduction of such registers. This is considered further in the next 
section. 
Secondly, the threat of an Order in Council to impose a register of 
beneficial ownership on the OTs undermines the right of the OTs to 
internal self-government. Sir Alan Duncan in the House of Commons 
noted that “Her Majesty’s Government are acutely conscious of the 
sensitivities in the overseas territories that the new [section] may 
provoke”. 
Indeed, criticism of the Act was soon forthcoming from the OTs. For 
example, in a Statement issued on 23 May 2018 the Premier of the British 
Virgin Islands said: “We are deeply disturbed by the decision in the 
United Kingdom which threatens to impose public registers on the BVI…. 
The Government of the Virgin Islands is committed to pursuing all 
available legal channels to ensure that publicly available beneficial 
ownership registers are introduced in the BVI only if and when they 
become a global standard, which would establish a level playing field for 
all…. According to the rule of law and the BVI’s constitution, the 
fundamental rights of privacy of all persons, including citizens and 
corporate entities, must be protected and upheld”.48 Given the revelations 
from the Panama Papers, any efforts by the OTs to prevent public 
disclosure of beneficial ownership suggests that they have something to 
hide.  
From a constitutional perspective, the use of Orders in Council to 
address UK concerns and requirements in the OTs is not uncommon. For 
example the UK abolished capital punishment as well as discrimination 
on grounds of sexuality in the OTs by way of Orders in Council. Perhaps 
the most notable example came in 2009 when an Order in Council was 
published49 effectively suspending the Government of the Turks & Caicos 
Islands and vesting its powers in the Governor. This followed a report by 
                                                     
48 See DS Smith, ‘Statement by Premier on the Royal Assent of the Sanctions and 
Anti-Money Laundering Bill’ (Government of the Virgin Islands, 23 May 2018) 
<http://www.bvi.gov.vg/media-centre/statement-premier-royal-assent-sanctions-
and-anti-money-laundering-bill> accessed 28 July 2018. 
49 The Turks & Caicos Islands Constitution (Interim Amendment) Order 2009 
placed before Parliament on 25 March 2009. 
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Sir Robin Auld which found that there was “a high probability of 
systematic corruption in government and the legislature and among public 
officials” in the Islands. This led to the making of the Turks and Caicos 
Islands Constitution Order 201150 which increased control of the UK over 
the islands. In particular section 14 provides: 
“Her Majesty reserves to Herself power, with the advice and consent 
of Her Privy Council, to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the Turks and Caicos Islands”.51 
Making laws designed to help combat money laundering, tax evasion 
and the financing of terrorism is clearly a matter of good governance and 
requiring each OT to establish and maintain a public record of beneficial 
ownership falls directly into this category.  
It is also worth repeating the view of the UK Government in the OT 
White Paper that “As a matter of constitutional law the UK Parliament has 
unlimited power to legislate for the Territories”.  
During the parliamentary debate on the Bill, a clause requiring the 
introduction of a similar provision for the CDs was withdrawn. This was 
in recognition of the very different constitutional relationship between the 
UK and the CDs, noted earlier. Thus the requirement for public registers 
does not currently extend to the CDs.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
The ongoing work of the FATF and G20 highlights the fact that 
developing transparency in the beneficial ownership of companies is now 
a global issue in the fight against money laundering, tax evasion, terrorist 
financing and other serious crime. A key goal in this regard is for tax 
authorities and law enforcement agencies to have “adequate and timely 
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons”.52 
This is facilitated by the effective exchange of beneficial ownership 
information between jurisdictions. Given their position as major offshore 
financial centres, the OTs and CDs play a key role especially as each is a 
separate jurisdiction for the purposes of mutual legal assistance requests. 
The Exchange of Notes between the UK and the OTs and CDs is therefore 
an important, and seemingly effective, contribution to this goal. The 
                                                     
50 SI 1681 of 2011. 
51 For a detailed discussion of the case see Nicholls and others (n 5) paras 11.74 
et seq. 
52 FATF Recommendation 24: see the discussion in Section 2 above. 
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process provides an excellent example for all jurisdictions to follow and 
one that the FATF and G20 should continue to actively encourage. 
The introduction in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 
2018 of a requirement for the OTs to introduce a public register of 
beneficial ownership is far more controversial. The need to address the 
issue is certainly urgent given the fact that, as noted earlier, £90 billion is 
reportedly laundered through the UK each year with the OTs being 
“central to this nefarious activity”. However, the use of the 2018 Act to 
impose the will of the UK Parliament on the OTs through an Order in 
Council, if necessary, highlights the uncertain constitutional relationship 
between the UK and OTs. Clegg notes that the current arrangements, at 
least so far as the Caribbean OTs are concerned, were not intended to be 
permanent but were originally proposed as stepping stones en route to 
independence. Thus the balance of administrative responsibilities is in 
practice often ill-defined.53 As he also notes, it is open to any OT to move 
towards full independence, if so desired. Whilst this issue is beyond the 
scope of this note, it may be pointed out that the OTs have benefited 
greatly economically from their continued association with the UK, 
especially as compared to those former colonies which chose to become 
independent states. Whatever the future constitutional relationship 
between the UK and OTs, the key point is that a public register of 
beneficial ownership must become a global standard and this is where the 
FATF, with its global reach, must take swift action.  
So far as the CDs are concerned, EU Directives and Regulations 
relating to financial services, economic and monetary union and taxation 
do not apply there.54 Thus they do not fall within the scope of the EU 5th 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive which was published on 19 June 2018 
and entered into force on July 9 2018. Amongst other things, the Directive 
(which was partly influenced by the publication of the Panama Papers) 
requires all states to allow “any member of the general public” access to 
beneficial ownership registers to obtain information concerning the 
beneficial owner’s month and year of birth, country of residence, and 
nationality, as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held. 
Member states are obliged to transpose the regulations into national law 
by January 20 2020. In practice the CDs have opted to follow many 
aspects of EU legislation and standards. Given the continued importance 
                                                     
53 See Peter Clegg (n 3) 2.  
54 Home Office, Review of Financial Regulation in the Crown Dependencies (Cm 
4109-I, 1998) para 5.3.5. 
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of the corporate and financial sectors in the CDs, complying with the EU 
anti-money laundering requirements may well become necessary. 
In the UK context, the ability of tax authorities and law enforcement 
agencies to obtain access to beneficial ownership information from the 
OTs and CDs enhances the prospect of identifying the person “with 
significant control” of a shell or shelf company. Using the Land Registry 
records which provide information about the legal ownership of real 
estate, many of which are companies registered in off-shore jurisdictions, 
it becomes possible to link the legal ownership of property to the 
beneficial owner(s). If this is a foreign politically exposed person (PEP)55 
or one of their family members or close associates, this will allow the UK 
law enforcement authorities to consider applying for an unexplained 
wealth order (UWO). Such an order requires the PEP to explain the 
legitimate source(s) of their wealth. The adequacy of the response or a 
refusal to provide such information can then be taken into account in any 
later civil recovery proceedings.56 
Given the importance of the contribution of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) such as Global Witness and Transparency International in 
highlighting and campaigning for transparency in beneficial ownership, 
the passing of the 2018 Act is a major success. It also offers them the 
prospect of enhancing their work, and that of other CSOs, on identifying 
the beneficial ownership of property and enhancing further the fallout 
from the Panama Papers.  
                                                     
55 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 362B(7) Inserted by the Criminal Finances 
Act 2017, states that a “politically exposed person means a person who is— 
(a) an individual who is, or has been, entrusted with prominent public functions 
by an international organisation or by a State other than the United Kingdom or 
another EEA State, 
(b) a family member of a person within paragraph (a), 
(c) known to be a close associate of a person within that paragraph, or 
(d) otherwise connected with a person within that paragraph”. 
56 See Criminal Finances Act 2017, ss 1-6. 
